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CanStrategybetaught?LtGenRobertSchmidle(ret)Ph.D.
IntheSevenPillarsofWisdomT.ELawrenceheld,likeClausewitzbeforehim,
thatwarswerefundamentallyirrationalactivitiesandanyattempttounderstandwhat
causedthemorhowtofightthemneededtopayhomagetothereflexivepracticesand
beliefsofthewarringparties.Thisisnottosaythattherewasnotaplacefor
calculationsinwar,e.g.inmattersoflogisticsorthetacticalapplicationofartillery.
Ratherandmostimportantly,Lawrenceproposedthatthosecalculationswerenotthe
keyfactorindecidingtheoutcomeofawar.
FamouslyLawrencewrotethat“Nine-tenthsoftacticswerecertainenoughtobe
teachableinschools;buttheirrationaltenthwaslikethekingfisherflashingacrossthe
pool,andinitlaythetestofgenerals”.Thetestofgenerals,whichveryfewbutthe
greatestwouldpass,wastheirabilitytounderstandandtapthetruesourceofpower–
theirrationaltenth.Itistheseeminglyirrationaldecisionofagreatcommandergoing
againsttheconventionalwisdomofthedaythatconfoundshisenemywhileinspiring
hisownforcestovictory.
Lawrenceexplainsfurtherabouttheessenceoftheirrationaltenth“Itcouldbe
ensuedbyinstinct(sharpenedbythoughtpracticingthestroke)untilatthecrisisitcame
naturally,areflex.”Lawrence’sperspectiveonirrationality,farfromseeingitas
somethingtobeavoided,wasthatitshouldbeunderstoodasprovidingahorizonof
possibilitiesnotevidentotherwise.Ofnote,theirrationaltenthwassomethingthat
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couldbedevelopedbystudyandcriticalthinkingandwasnotsomethingthatcame
merelyfromexperience.
Thefocusofhisstrategywasonusing‘irregular’asopposedtoregularor
conventionaluniform-wearingforces.Lawrencebelievedthatitwasimportanttothink
ofwar,atleasthiswar,intermsofasymmetricpresentationsbyhisirregularforcesto
theregularforcesoftheTurks.Hegoessofarastosay“Inarealsensemaximum
disorderwasourequilibrium.”DisorderwasforLawrencenotsomethingtobeavoided
ortamed.Rather,itwasthenaturalorderofhiswar,itwasinfactthestateof
equilibrium.
ThroughouthiscampaignontheArabianPeninsulaLawrencecontinuedto
redefinetheWesternwayofwarintermsofhisnewwayofwar.Hefundamentally
soughttoembraceuncertaintyanddevelophisstrategyofresistance,informedbyan
understandingoftheirrationalinhumandecision-making.Hetookissuewiththe
traditionalmodelofwarfareandtheensuingstrategiesthatwereemployedbyboth
sidesontheWesternFrontinFrancein1916.Inhismind,theprotagonistswere
treatingwarasifitwereonelargeNewtonianformulatobesolvedbycalculation.
Lawrence,ontheotherhandsawhiswaragainsttheTurksnotasamathematical
calculationtobesolvedbyarithmetic.Instead,hebelievedittobeafluidandchaotic
enterprise,uniquetoitshistoricalcontext,tobeexploitedandmadeevidentinthe
guiseofthe‘irrationaltenth.’
Whenwethinkaboutthepedagogicalmethodsusedtoteachstrategyitis
importanttobeginbydistinguishingbetweenstrategicthinkingandstrategicplanning.
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Theinitialconsiderationwhendevelopingastrategyshouldstartbyincorporating
designthinkingintotheprocess,proceedingthefollow-onstageofconstructive
planning.Unfortunately,thatsequenceisnotalwaysthecaseandwhentheactivityof
planningisnotinformedbythelogicofdesigntheconsequencescanbedisastrous.The
U.S.strategyintheVietnamWarisanexampleofthelackofdesign.Theultimate
resultsofthatwarwereevidencethatthestrategy(usingoverwhelmingfirepowerto
attritetheenemy)failedbecauseitobviouslyrancountertoachievingthedesiredend
state(astableanddemocraticSouthVietnam).
Thepointhereisthatstrategicthinkingandstrategicplanningarefundamentally
twodifferentmentalactivitiesandneedtobeunderstoodasdiscretebuthorizontally
integratedactivities.Inthispaper,Ihavebeenexploringtheissueofteachingsomeone
tothinkstrategically.Importantly,strategicthinkingisatypeofdesignactivity,itisan
intuitive,creativeactivitynotareasoningandcalculatingone.Planningontheother
handisanarithmeticactivity.Saiddifferently,onementalactivity,thatofplanning-is
analytic,theothermentalactivity,thatofthinking-issynthetic.
Iwouldfurthersuggestthattherearethreefundamentalcharacteristicsof
strategicthinking-creativity,synthesisandperhapsmostimportantly-character.
Determiningthemethodforteachingthesecharacteristicsbeginsbythinkingabouthow
onewouldteachcreativity,i.e.answeringtheimpliedquestion:canyouteachsomeone
tobecreative?Whiletherearetechniquesforteachingcreativitytheextenttowhich
theyareeffectiveindevelopingatrulycreativemindisnotcertain.Although,Iwould
suggestthatwecanencouragecreativityinstrategiststhroughanunderstandingof
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synthesis(thinking)asthefundamentalmentalprocessofthedesignphaseof
developingastrategy.Therefore,aframeofreferencethatenablessomeoneto
incorporateadifferentperspectiveinthedevelopmentofastrategyisanessentialfor
enablingthecreativityrequiredintheinitialstageofstrategydevelopment.
Thefirststepinchangingourperspectiveistofundamentallychangethemodel
usedtoinformthatperspectivefromonethatprivilegesverticalintegrationtoonethat
privilegeshorizontalintegration.Thisnewperspectivereliesonthemodelofthe
rhizome(frombotany–amassofrootsthatgrowperpendiculartogravity,emanating
newrootsfromnodesinrootstructure).Inotherwords,synthesis,thedesignthinking
thatproceedsplanningmustfocusonhorizontalsynthesis.ThethirdcharacteristicI
proposed–thatofcharacterisperhapsthehardesttoteach,atleastifonethinksin
termsoftraditionalpedagogy.MuchliketheSocraticargumentsaboutvirtue,itmay
onlybepossibletoshowwhatcharacterisandwhatitisnotbyexampleandnotby
educationoftheintellect.
Ifweassumeforaminutethatstrategycanbetaught,howwouldweteachit?
Isitliketryingtoteachvirtueorcreativity?Shouldwethinkaboutaperson’smoral
developmentasananalogy?Inthecaseofmoraldevelopmentempathyisanobvious
requirement.This,inturn,bringsupthequestion:howwouldyouteachthequalityof
empathytoapersonsothatitbecomesunconsciouslyreflexiveinheractions?Onthe
otherhand,ifweassumethatstrategycannotbetaught,thatgoodstrategistsareonly
bornandnevermade,thenweareleftwithbutoneoptionfordevelopingstrategists.
Thatoptionistoscreenpotentialcandidatestodeterminewhichoneswouldmakethe
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beststrategists.Thisoptionsubsequentlyraisesthequestion-whatarethedesired
qualitiesthatwewouldscreenforinpotentialcandidates?Leavingthisquestion
unansweredfornow,letustransitiontoahistoricalexampleofhowastrategywas
developedandtheendresultoftheimplementationofthatstrategy.
ThestrategythatresultedintheGermanSchlieffenPlanfortheinvasionof
France,initiatedinAugust1914,isacaseinpoint.InherbookTheGunsofAugust
BarbaraTuchmancontendsthatthestrategythatgavebirthtotheSchlieffenPlanwas
anamalgamofculturalpredispositions.“AhundredyearsofGermanphilosophywent
intothemakingofthisdecisioninwhichtheseedofself-destructionlayembedded,
waitingforitshour.”Whileshemayhavebeenrightaboutthepowerofthenarratives
thatacountrytellsitself,andbelievestobetrue,shewaswrongtoblameonlythe
Germans.
TheFrenchbeliefin‘elan’–inthewilltowin,exemplifiedintheunquestioned
beliefinthepowerofthe‘spiritofFrance’resultedinastrategyfundamentallybasedon
prioritizingoffensivemilitaryaction.ThisstrategywasembracedbyFrenchmilitary
leadershipinspiteoftheevidentdevelopmentsinmodernweapons.Astrategybased
on‘elan’wastranslatedintothetacticsoffrontalassaultsbyinfantryacrossopen
terrainandintodeadlymachinegunfire.Thesetacticsyieldednothingmorethanhigh
casualtiesandbloodystalemateontheWesternfrontduringtheFirstWorldWar.This
strategywouldnotdefeattheGermanArmyuntilyearslaterandonlythenbythe
additionoftremendousamountsofadditionalresources.
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Importantly,thenewweaponsinthatwarsuchastanks,airplanes,machine
guns,poisongas,etc.wouldnotprovebeakeyfactorintheoutcomeonthebattlefield.
Itwasintheendnottheempirical,objectivesfactorsthatformedthestrategicthinking
andoperationalexecutionintheWorldWarI.Rather,itwasthestoriesthesovereign
leaderstoldthemselves.Itwasthose‘culturalnarratives’thatcapturedtheirthinking
abouttheirenemiesandrationalizedtheiractionsforwar.Itwasfearthatgrippedthe
protagonists,justasThucydideshadpredicted.Fearcoloredtheassumptionsthose
strategistsmadeintheirplanningastheywereconfrontedwiththepossibilityofwarin
Europeandbeyond.
ThethirdcharacteristicofstrategicthinkingisowedtotheancientGreeks.
Amongthem,Heraclituswasfamousforsayingthat“characterisfate.”Characteris
madeupofthepersonalvaluesandtraitsthatdefinesomeone,thewordcharacteris
alsousedasameasureofmeritwhendescribinganother.Forexample,apersonof
goodcharacterisonewhoisethicalandhonorableandapersonofbadcharacter,the
opposite.Aboveall,characterisachoice,butachoiceformedandconstrainedbythe
contextofthecultureinwhichsomeonelives.Ifcharacterisfatethen‘good’character
isessentialinasovereignleaderandfundamentaltothecoherentdevelopmentand
executionofanynationalstrategy.
Withthisasbackground,aquestionnaturallyariseslikeitdidinourdiscussionof
virtue,abouthow(orwhether)charactercanbetaught.Ifoneistohavethe‘right’
characteritwouldentailaperspectivethatnecessarilycomesfromadeep
understandingofone’sowncultureaswellasanother’s.However,andmost
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importantlyforstrategicthinkers,characteriswhatenablessomeonetotranscendthe
conventionalwisdomoftheirculture.Rightcharacterisevidentwhenitfostersaclear
senseofskepticismsharpenedbycontinuousrefectionabouttheassumptionsupon
whichaparticularstrategywasdeveloped.InAugustof1914allthekeyplayersinthe
unfoldingdramawerefilteringtheworldthroughnarrativesbuildontheirindividualand
collectiveexperience.Thosefilterswerecoloredbythesamethreethingsthat
ThucydidesproposedwereresponsibleforthePeloponnesianwar–fear,hubrisand
(self)interest.
Thucydideswasalsogivingplaytothedistinction,illuminatedcenturieslaterby
T.E.Lawrencebetweentherationalandtheirrational.Inthiscaseitcouldbeargued
thathonorandhubrisaredrivenbyseeminglyirrationalforcesandthatnational
interestisdrivenbymorerationalforces.Infact,Iwouldarguethatthereisample
evidencetosuggestthatevenostensivelyobjectiveandrationalconcernsfornational
self-interestofaparticularcountryarefrequentlycastasideinfavoroftheirrational
forcesoffearandhubris.Evenacursoryviewofhistoryshowsthatitisnotuncommon
fornationsandpeopletomakestrategicchoicesthatareclearlyatoddswiththeirown
self-interest.TheattackonFrancebytheGermansin1914,drivingthroughBelgium,
whichbeganWorldWarIinearnest,isbutoneexample.
Inourconsiderationoftheefficacyofteachingstrategyitisusefultorecall
otherpastexamples.OnesuchexampleisthePrussian/GermanKriegsAkademieasit
wasreformedin1810togivemilitaryofficersageneraleducationinstrategyinaddition
toteachingtactics.Althoughitprovidedamorediverseacademiccurriculumforits
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officers,theAkademiewasmainlyfocusedoninstructioninmilitarytacticsandstaff
work.Itwasdesignedtoproduceexceptionallyhigh-qualityofficersforthePrussian,
latertheGerman,GeneralStaff.UpongraduationfromtheAkademiethoseofficers
wouldthenbechargedwithguidingwhateverpoliticalleadershipwasinpowertoward
theoptimumstrategyforensuringthecontinueddominanceofthePrussianState.One
ofthemostwell-knowngraduatesofthisschool,AlfredvonSchlieffenwasthestrategist
whocreatedtheplanthatcarriedhisnameandwasthemodelfortheGermaninvasion
ofFrancein1914.Interestingly,inspiteofhisschoolingattheKriegsAkademie,
Schlieffenwaspurportedtohavesaid,“Amanisborn,notmade,astrategist.”
Anotherexamplethatwecandrawontoanswerthequestion“Canstrategybe
taught?”isfromPlato’sMenoDialoginwhichhehasSocratesaddressthequestion
“Canvirtuebetaught?”ThestorybeginswithSocratesaskingforadefinitionofvirtue.
Aftermuchbackandforthheprovidessomeillustrativeexamplesinvolvingthenot-so-
virtuoussonsoftwovirtuousAthenians(PericlesandThucydides).Basedonthedialog,
Socratescomestotheconclusionthatvirtueisnotknowledgeandthereforecannotbe
taught.Virtue,accordingtoSocratescomesfromdivineinspiration.Virtuousmeninhis
viewareliketheprophetsandoraclesthatspeakwisdomonlyinthiscaseitiswisdom
thathasnotbeenacquiredbyeducation.
FromAristotle,wegetaslightlydifferentview,heinitiallyagreeswithSocratesbut
thenproceedstodevelopawayforapersontobecomevirtuouswithoutrelyingon
divineinspiration.Tobegin,Aristotleproposesthatmoralvirtuesarenotinnatein
humansalthoughwedohavesomenaturalcapacityfortheirdevelopment.Virtuesare
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attainedlikeallhabitsbypractice,“…welearnbydoingthem…webecomebraveby
doingbraveacts.”Theimportantconnectionhereisbetweentheactofrepeatingan
actionuntilitbecomesahabitandthesubsequentandreflexiveactionsofaperson
displayingthatvirtue,i.e.bravery.
Aristotlebelievedthatwebecomevirtuousbypracticingvirtuousbehaviorand
whenthatbehaviorbecomesahabit,wearemoreapttochoosetoactinamannerthat
displaysvirtuousbehavior.TheimplicationofallthisisthatAristotlebelievedthatmoral
virtuescouldbetaught.Furthermore,hebelievedthathumansareneithergoodnor
badbuthavethecapacitytobeeither.Itisthroughapropereducationthataperson
attainsvirtuessuchasbravery,moderation,justice,generosity,etc.Aristotlecontends
thatvirtuesaretheresultofhabituallypracticingvirtuousbehavior.Ifheisrightwhat
doesthatmeanforthedevelopmentofstrategists?Whatkindsofhabitswouldyou
teachsomeonetomakethemastrategist?
TheBritishhistorianLiddellHart,athoughtfulstudentofstrategyhimself,believed
thatagreatstrategistmustfirsthaveexperienceintheworld.However,healsoheld
thatexperiencealonewasnotenoughtomakeagreatstrategist.Heinsistedthatby
itselfanindividual’sempiricalexperiencewouldactuallylimittheboundsofimagined
possibilities.Insteadadeepstudyofhistory,whichisvicariousexperience,would
expandtheboundsofimaginedpossibilities.Healsobelievedthatpartofaneffective
foundationforastrategistwasanin-depthunderstandingofotheracademicdisciplines,
inparticular-psychology.Withthisinmindwemightwonderifthebeststrategistsare
morelikeIsaiahBerlin’sfamousfox,whoknowsmanythings;seeinginterconnected
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patternsfromseeminglydisconnectedeventsbysensingandunderstandingnuance.
TheoppositeofthefoxaccordingtoBerlinisthehedgehog,whounderstandsonebig
thingandseestheworldthroughthelensofthatonegreatidea.Arguably,the
hedgehoghaslessroomforflexibilityandagilityinthoughtandactionsbutdoeshave
theadmirablequalityofhavingasimple,singularlyfocusedworldview.Iwouldsuggest
thatthebeststrategistsarepartfoxandparthedgehog.Theyareabletofindthat
elusivebalancebetweenthetwoworldviewsthroughanunderstandingofthenuance
ofeachone’sepistemologicalframework.
Letusnowgobacktotheoriginalquestion,“Canstrategybetaught?”Theanswer
inmymindis–wellitdepends.Ibeginexaminingthisquestionbygoingbacktothe
questionSocratesaskedinthebeginningofthedialogintheMeno,“Canvirtuebe
taught?”However,insteadoftryingtodefinevirtueIwilltrytodefinetheideaof
strategy.Iwouldproposethatstrategyistheactivityofaligningresourcestoa
postulatedendstateinordertoidentifytheinherentrisksintheexecutionofthe
actionsnecessarytoachievethatendstate.Theactivityofdevelopingastrategyhas
twoparts;thefirstistheanalysisoftheproblemthestrategyistryingtoaddress.This
partrequiresin-depthknowledgeofthemechanicalandarithmeticcalculations
regardingfriendlyforcecapabilitiesastheyrelatetoadversarycapabilities.Thisisthe
analyticphaseandtheskillsnecessarytocollectandanalyzedatacan,asT.E.Lawrence
advocated,clearlybetaughtinschools.
However,itisthatlast‘irrationaltenth’thatisofgreatestinterestandiswhat
requiresthementalactivityofsynthesis.Thisphasebringstogetherourexperiencesin
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theworldandtheresultsofourstudyofhistory,literature,psychology,etc.Synthesisin
thiscontextshouldnotfocusongainingtacticalinsightsintoweaponsandforce
dispositions.Ratheritshouldfocusongaininginsightintotheconsciousnessofthe
opponent,whoshouldbetheobjectofintentionalityofourgaze.
Thefundamentalmodeloftheworldviewthatinformsourcurrentthinkingabout
teachingstrategymustchangeifwearetoguidepeopletothinkcriticallyabout
strategy.Imentionedearlierinthispapertheuseoftherhizomemodeltofoster
creativityinthedesignphaseofstrategydevelopment.NowIwillpickupthatthreadto
addresstheproblemsinherentinusingthecurrenthierarchicalandtraditionalcausal
model.TothatendIproposethattheconceptoftherhizomefromDeleuzeand
Guattari’sAThousandPlateausprovidesarichanalogy.Theydescribearhizomeinthe
followingmanner:“itisunliketreesortheirroots,itconnectsanypointtoanyother
point,anditstraitsarenotnecessarilylinkedtotraitsofthesamenature.”The
importantcharacteristicinthisdefinitionisthattherhizomeistheoppositeofthe
conventionalmodelofatree.Thetreemodelismostoftenusedtodescribethe
relationshipofthingsintheworld.Thetreehasaclearbeginning(roots)andending
(leaves)andfollowsalogicalpatterntoitsgrowth,whereastherhizomedoesnot.The
rhizomeisahorizontalrootstructurethatexpandsfromitsnodes,itiscapableof
creatingnewrootstructuresthatgrowhorizontally,nottransitioningtoavertical,
hieraticalplantstructure.Therhizomeprovidesamodelinfusedwiththecharacteristics
ofthe‘irrationaltenth.’
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ThetreeanalogyisthetraditionalmentalmodelinWesternthinkingandis
evidentinthestructuresofourinstitutionswhethertheyaremilitary,government,
schoolsorbusinessorganizations.Thereisaclearrationalitytothismodelbutitis
restrictingandconfining.Itlimitsamorecompleteunderstandingofeventsbecauseof
itscausal,verticalnature.Accordingly,thetreemodelactsasaconstraintinlimitingthe
possiblecoursesofactionoroptionsmadeevidenttoastrategist.
TherhizomeontheotherhandismoreliketheInternet,withnorealbeginningor
end.Ithasnologicalgrowthpatternandnoclearrationalitytoinformahierarchical
connectionofanyonepartwithanyotherpart.Therhizomecaresnotforthesimilarity
oreventhedifferenceofthoseparts.Uniquely,inthecontextinwhichIamusingthe
term,rhizomeisnotathingbutaprocess.Itisaprocessthatcallsintoquestionthe
relevanceofhierarchicalorganizationsasmodelsforstrategydevelopment.Rhizomeis
morelikeamap,whichcanbeopenedtoanypoint,anywhereandshowapathtoany
otherpoint,anywhere.Ithasnobeginningorendbutisalwaysinthemiddle.Therefore,
arhizomeisneversomethingthatisorsomethingthatwas,butitisalwayssomething
thatisintheprocessofbecoming,itisnotthisorthatbut,and,and,and…The
strategistmustfocusontheactofbecoming,notonthestasisofbeing.
Theeducationofastrategistshouldtakeplacewithinthecontextoftherhizome.
Thepurposeofteachingstrategyistodevelopdesignersnotcraftsman.Thecraftsman’s
skillscanbetaughtlikethetacticstowhichLawrencereferred.Thedesigner,onthe
otherhandrequiresaninterdisciplinaryeducation.Thateducationisaholisticprocess,
whichisconductedhorizontally,notverticallyandbeginswithincorporatingthetenets
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ofdesignthinking.Amongthemorerelevantofthosetenetsare:honestlyconfronting
thefacts,breakingthroughthenoisetodiscoverwhatistrulyimportantandscalingfor
impactatanappropriatetimeandplace.
Thedesignerenvisionstheintegrationofmanythings,evenmanyseemingly
dissimilarthings.Hedoesnotneedthetacticalskillsofacraftsmanbecausehedoesnot
somuchneedtoknowhowtomakesomething,asheneedstoknowthemyriadwaysit
canbeused.Infact,astrategistwhofocusesprimarilyontacticalactionsisnotan
effectivestrategist.Thisisbecausehisworldviewisnotalignedwiththelimitless
horizonofstrategicdesign.Aneffectivestrategistwillgenerallynothebeagood
craftsmanbecausehelacksthepropensity,skillsanddifferentworldviewofthe
craftsman.Thecraftsmanpursuestheexcellencethatcomesfromverticalintegration
whilethestrategistlooksfortheephemeralpossibilitiesofincreasedhorizontal
integration.Finally,thestrategistmustalsobecomfortableseekingtointegrate
empirical,practicalcapabilitieswithconceptsinordertoinformtheemploymentof
thosecapabilities.
Astrategistshouldalwaysbesearchingforthat‘irrationaltenth,’tryingtofindthe
indirectorasymmetricapproachtothechallengeshefaces.Lastly,hemustbecareful
nottothinkoftheworldandthereforenottodesignastrategy,whichsuccumbsto
inflexiblebutwellknownhierarchicalmodels.Thosemodelsarelikelytobemirror
imagesofhiscultureandexperienceandareascomfortableforhimassittinginthe
shadeofatreeonahotsummerday.Instead,thestrategistshouldusethemodelofthe
rhizome,itsrootstwistedandrandom,challenginghissensesandcausinghimtosquint
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uncomfortablyinthebrightsunlightashetriestofocus.Itisonlythenthathecan
uncovertheassumptionsthatunderlayhisdevelopingstrategy,exposingthemtothe
light.