7Human Rights
Abdullahi A. An-Na`im
Human rights is not commonly accepted as a field in sociology, despite the clearoverlap in subject matter and possibilities of mutual conceptual and method-ological influence. In terms of the organization of this volume, for example,freedom from discrimination, as an overarching human rights principle, hasobvious implications for fields in sociology ranging from citizenship andnational identity to education, stratification and mobility, and health policy.Specific human rights, like freedom of speech and association, are clearly rele-vant to issues of political participation and labor. Gender, sexuality, children,and race are major themes among human rights scholars. The relationshipbetween the state and civil society is central to the international articulationand national implementation of human rights in all societies around the world,and as such of interest to sociologists. Human rights considerations are alsorelevant to the mediation of competing claims to economic and social justice,identity, and communal autonomy, in global cross-cultural and comparativeterms. These concerns join those of sociologists over such issues as globalizationand postcolonial power relations, social movements, development, accountabil-ity of transnational corporations for labor relations, and environmental con-cerns.
To explore possibilities of collaboration and mutual influence betweensociologists and human rights scholars, I begin with an overview of the humanrights paradigm as the framework for the specification and implementation ofrights through national politics and international relations. Since many of themain themes of human rights are commonly known in terms of constitutional orcivil rights (subject to the crucial difference indicated later), sociologists mightwant to consider whether their familiarity with the working of domestic(national) civil rights could enable them to contribute to mediating what I callthe paradox of international accountability for the domestic practice of
sovereign states. Mediating that paradox also calls for some understanding of thedebate over the universality and cultural/contextual relativity of human rights,discussed in the second section. In the third section of this chapter, I discuss theneed for complementary legal and social science approaches to the implementa-tion of human rights as a framework for justice; and provide a brief review ofsome of the ways in which sociologists have addressed human rights issues.
The Human Rights ParadigmThe Human Rights Paradigm
Human rights, in a generic sense, can be seen as a framework for an adequateresponse to the profound social concerns of persons and their communities. Thisprimarily procedural sense of human rights is about creating and maintaining`̀ the space'' for individuals and groups to achieve justice, personal security andwell-being, general political stability and economic development, and so forth.At the same time, however, human rights norms do have a specific normativecontent that reflects a certain understanding of what these individual and soci-etal objectives mean, and how they should be realized in practice. In a substan-tive sense, therefore, human rights have a clear ideological orientation to what itmeans to be human, and how social and political institutions should work inorder to achieve certain ends. However, there is a tension between these twodimensions of human rights. To inspire and motivate people to take themseriously, human rights need to have significant and relevant normative contentin each specific context.Yet this is likely to be resisted by privileged and powerfulpersons and groups in any society precisely because of the potential to changeexisting power relations. Aspects of this tension and its implications will becomeclearer after a brief explanation of what human rights are commonly understoodto mean, and how they are supposed to work.
By the human rights paradigm I mean the idea that the protection of certainindividual and collective/group rights, as discussed below, is a matter of inter-national concern, rather than the exclusive internal affair of states. Paradox-ically, as explained below, the same states control the processes of determiningthese rights at the international level, and applying them within national jur-isdictions. Moreover, what the so-called international community may do abouta state that willfully and persistently disregards its international obligations toprotect those rights is also subject to a complex interaction of legal principlesand practical considerations. For instance, the notion of `̀ humanitarian inter-vention'' to stop serious human rights violations within a country (as claimed bythe NATO governments who intervened militarily in Kosovo in 1999 against thegovernment of Yugoslavia) involves balancing such factors as human concernabout the suffering of the victims, the risks of action or inaction for internationalpeace and security, and the political and economic interests of the interveningstate(s), as well as the short-and long-term implications of violating the sover-eignty of that country.
Much of the normative, as well as the procedural, dimension of human rightsis traditionally supposed to be provided for in national constitutions and laws
Human Rights 87
for domestic application by the judicial and executive organs of the state, as amatter of national sovereignty. Earlier attempts by some states acting collectivelyto extend such regimes into the boundaries of another state included interna-tional efforts to end slavery and to protect minorities during the nineteenth andearly twentieth centuries. But the real launch of the human rights paradigm inthe generally accepted sense came about around the middle of the twentiethcentury. The horrific events of the Second World War prompted strong agree-ment by the mid-1940s on the need to effectively check the serious failure of anystate to protect the rights of all persons and groups within its territorial jurisdic-tion (Steiner and Alston, 1996, p. 59). That was the first time there has ever beensuch a broad consensus about the need to reconcile respect for the sovereignty ofa state with the protection of certain human rights as rights due to every humanbeing by virtue of his or her humanity, without distinction on such grounds asrace, sex, belief, language, or national origin.
But since the process of determining the nature and scope of these rights, andapproaches to their international protection, was confined to sovereign stateswhich were members of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, only four Africanstates and eight Asian states were included. The rest of Africa and Asia wascolonized at that time by the same European powers that were proclaiming theuniversality of human rights at the UN. Moreover, some basic ambiguities in theoriginal concept continue to frustrate the prospects of its practical application.For example, these rights are proclaimed in general terms as belonging to allhuman beings, while their realization is strongly associated with citizenship of aspecific country. Although some general principles of international law stillapply to how a state may treat non-citizens who happen to be within its territory,the distinction between citizen and non-citizen is sometimes difficult to justifyfrom a human rights point of view (Turner, 1993b, p. 495; 1997). To avoid thesecomplex issues in this brief overview, I refer to persons under the jurisdiction of astate, instead of identifying them as its citizens.
The consensus of the mid-1940s was strongly reflected in the Charter of theUN of 1945, which is the most authoritative document of the present interna-tional order. According to Article 1 of the Charter, `̀ The Purposes of the UnitedNations are . . . (3) To achieve international cooperation in solving internationalproblems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and inpromoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental free-doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.'' Whileemphasizing this basic obligation in other Articles, the UN Charter left the taskof definition and implementation of `̀ human rights and fundamental freedoms''to subsequent developments.
That process began with the drafting and adoption of the Universal Declara-tion of Human Rights of 1948. But the Declaration is not binding as suchbecause, according to the UN Charter, resolutions of the General Assembly aremerely recommendations to member states of the organization. The drafting andadoption of detailed treaties, which are binding under international law,followed, to provide definitions of rights and their implementation. Moreover,some human rights norms can also be found in certain principles of what is
88 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im
known as customary international law, like the prohibition of genocide, warcrimes, and crimes against humanity. These norms are binding on all states,regardless of their ratification of treaties on those matters. Some human rightsscholars argue that certain aspects of the Universal Declaration have becomebinding as customary international law. For example, the prohibition of tortureis generally accepted as binding on all states as a principle of customaryinternational law, regardless of their ratification of the specific treaties on thesubject.
The treaties setting the international `̀ legal'' standards of human rights rangein scope from earlier Conventions on labor rights (1930), genocide (1948), andslavery (1956), to the broad 1966 International Covenants, one on economic,social and cultural rights, and the other on civil and political rights. There is alsoa growing number of specialized treaties, like the Conventions for the Elimina-tion of All Forms of Discrimination, on grounds of race (1965) and gender(1979), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989. Similar stand-ards appear in the regional documents of the European, Inter-American, andAfrican systems (Steiner and Alston, 1996, p. 563). This legal regime alsoincludes principles of humanitarian law regulating the conduct of armed forcesin conflict situations, like the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the 1951Refugees Convention. Human rights standards have also been elaboratedthrough several major international conferences. During the 1990s, for instance,human rights principles and policies were elaborated in such documents as theVienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1994) and the Beijing Platformfor Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995). Human rights areintegral to the mandate of specialized intergovernmental agencies like the Inter-national Labor Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO),and the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP).
As the increasingly wide range of local, regional, and global actors andprocesses envisioned by this complex web of documents and institutions clearlyshows, the development of an international legal framework cannot mean thatthe implementation of human rights be left to purely legal approaches. The basicidea of the human rights paradigm is now firmly established in internationalrelations, as well as in the national politics of the vast majority of countriesaround the world, subject to differing assessment of its efficacy or consistency ofits application. Nevertheless, the basic paradox remains: how to achieve effect-ive international supervision of domestic human rights protection withoutviolating national sovereignty as the expression of the right to self-determina-tion, which is itself a collective human right under the first Article of the 1966Covenants.
From this perspective, I suggest, social science approaches would be extremelyimportant for understanding the processes of legal articulation and implementa-tion of these rights as the proper and legitimate exercise of the right to self-determination, rather than its negation. Sociological analyses are needed, forexample, for understanding the processes of social construction of rights, whoseinterests are served by those processes, and the role of civil society and socialmovements in generating the political will to adopt and implement international
Human Rights 89
treaties protecting these rights. Such insights are essential for mediating theparadox of international protection of human rights through respect for sover-eignty, instead of its violation, as explained below.
It is true that, by ratifying treaties and subscribing to international humanrights policy statements, states are indicating voluntary acceptance of humanrights obligations as limitations on their national sovereignty. But that notionitself can be seen as entrenching, rather than diminishing, the underlying para-dox, because it is the state that decides when, how, and to what extent to limit itsown sovereignty. First, the structure and content of any human rights treaty arenegotiated and agreed among the delegates of states, before the treaty is openedfor ratification. Second, and regardless of its publicly declared position, no stateis legally bound until it formally ratifies the treaty according to its own internalconstitutional and political process. Moreover, subject to the requirements of theinternational law of treaties, a state has the right not only to enter `̀ reservations''limiting the scope of its obligations under a treaty, but also to repudiate a treatythat it has previously ratified. Third, the state is also intended to play a crucialrole in the interpretation and implementation within its territory of the humanrights treaties it has ratified. Where national legislation is required to incorpor-ate international treaties into national law, as in the United States and UnitedKingdom, the domestic normative content of a treaty is effectively determined bythe way it is expressed in legislative language, and interpreted through thejudicial process, of the country (Steiner and Alston, 1996, p. 26). In otherwords, domestic compliance with a state's international obligations to protecthuman rights can only be achieved by the official organs of the same state.
Thus, while intended to ensure the protection of certain minimum rights,international protection is dependent on the active cooperation of states inlimiting their freedom of action within their own domestic jurisdiction. Theparadox of self-regulation by the state of its own behavior is, of course, alsotrue of domestic constitutional and legal protection of rights. The crucial differ-ence, noted above, is that constitutional rights are the product of internaldynamics, whereas the human rights paradigm seeks to influence domesticsituations in favor of upholding certain internationally recognized standards.In other words, the paradox is sharper for the human rights paradigm because ithas to overcome internal opposition within the country in question, withouthaving the power to impose its will on states which refuse to comply. The need tomediate this enduring paradox calls for a clear understanding of the nature andfunctioning of social and political forces and institutions within each country,and in its relations with other countries.
It is not helpful to simply call for formal limitations on state sovereignty,because that is neither practically feasible nor necessarily good for the protectionof human rights in the long term. Formal limitations on sovereignty are notfeasible because sovereignty is integral to the foundations of the present inter-national order, as entrenched in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter and otherinternational documents, and fundamentally affirmed by national constitutionsaround the world. Since states are the principal actors at both the internationaland national levels, they are unlikely to relinquish their own autonomy by
90 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im
abandoning sovereignty or allowing other actors to achieve that result. Even ifthey were practically feasible, formal limitations might also be counterproduc-tive because sovereignty is the essential expression of the fundamental collectiveright to self-determination, as the practical vehicle of domestic policy and thenecessary medium of international relations.
A more realistic and desirable approach, I suggest, is to seek to diminish thenegative consequence of the paradox of self-regulation by infusing the humanrights ethos into the fabric of the state itself and the global context in which itoperates. In that way, the protection of human rights becomes the outcome ofthe free exercise of the right to self-determination, instead of being seen as anexternal imposition which violates that right. This paradigm shift can best beachieved by upholding the universality of human rights as, in the words of thePreamble to the Universal Declaration, `̀ the common standard of achievementfor all peoples and all nations.'' Since external imposition will probably beresisted as a clear violation of sovereignty, while voluntary compliance withcommonly agreed standards is likely to be seen as vindication of sovereignauthority, the universality of human rights must reflect true consensus aroundthe world. At a formal level, that is said to be achieved through agreementamong states, as the representatives of their societies under international law.But according to the human rights paradigm itself, and as a matter of practicalpolitics, international agreements are legitimate and sustainable only to theextent that they express the genuine consent of national societies and localcommunities.
The Quandary of Universality and RelativityThe Quandary of Universality and Relativity
The issue of popular acceptance of the human rights paradigm is frequentlydiscussed in terms of a binary of universality and relativity (Steiner and Alston,1996, p. 166; Negengast and Turner, 1997), as if one has to either fully accept orcompletely reject the universality of certain rights for all human beings. At oneend of this purported spectrum are said to be countries which claim cultural/religious relativity or contextual specificity to justify rejecting or qualifyingcertain universal human rights norms, in contrast to those which are supposedto fully accept the universality of all human rights, at the other end. Whereassome Islamic and East Asian countries are commonly placed on the relativistside, Western countries are commonly assumed to be universalist. Upon reflec-tion, however, one can see that such a binary view of this issue is both misleadingand difficult to substantiate or maintain in practice.
A binary view is misleading in assuming either that human rights can beculturally and contextually neutral, or that a conception of human rights emerg-ing within one culture or context can be accepted by other cultures for applica-tion in their context. To explain, I would first note that, as a normative systemthat seeks to influence people's behavior and direct the institutions which regu-late their lives, human rights can only be the product of culture, to be interpretedfor practical application in a specific context. In other words, human rights
Human Rights 91
norms can be neither imagined nor understood in the abstract, without referenceto the concrete daily experience of the people who are supposed to implementthem. As indicated above, the human rights paradigm is founded on the belief inthe possibility of universal rights, due to all human beings, everywhere, as thebasis for international concern about how people are treated in any part of theworld. Yet, since any conception of human rights as a normative system is theproduct of some culture(s), a given set of these rights can be perceived as alien orunacceptable to other cultures. That is exactly the quandary of universality andrelativity: namely, how to determine universally valid and applicable humanrights norms, which would naturally tend to reflect certain cultural values andinstitutions, without expecting one society to submit to the normative system ofanother.
It is difficult to substantiate a binary view of universality and relativity ofhuman rights because that would ignore the realities of power relations in theworld, and oversimplify the positions and behavior of countries on both sides ofthis alleged divide. For example, the criteria and process by which the present setof international human rights was established in the first place were not asinclusive as they ought to have been. As noted earlier, the vast majority of thepeoples of Africa and Asia were not represented at the UN, except by the samecolonial powers which had for decades violated the basic human rights ofcolonized peoples. Upon achieving independence, African and Asian states hadno choice but to at least pretend to accept the pre-established concept, structure,and content of the human rights paradigm as a condition of membership in theinternational community. That is to say, the balance of global economic, milit-ary, and political power relations in the postcolonial world has enabled thedeveloped countries to raise the human rights paradigm they have establishedthemselves as the condition for membership in the international community.This does not mean that this paradigm can never become universally acceptedand applied. Rather, the point is that efforts to promote universality should befounded on a clear understanding of the issues from different perspectives.
It is profoundly problematic, in my view, to assume that the universality ofhuman rights is `̀ self-evident'' or has been `̀ established,'' and all that remains isto `̀ pressure'' a few ruling elites in developing countries to abandon their`̀ opportunistic'' denial of the obvious. This view, on the hand, encourageshypocrisy among the governments of developing countries who have to paylip-service to human rights in exchange for favorable treatment by developedcountries in such matters as development assistance, support for credit frominternational financial institutions, and/or the grant of special trade status. Thenature of existing power relations, on the other hand, enables the governmentsof developed countries to raise the human rights paradigm selectively, in theservice of their own foreign policy objectives (compare the US positions regard-ing China and Cuba), without regard to the integrity and credibility of thisparadigm as a whole. The application of double standards in judging similarsituations is possible because of the lack of an independent check on the allegedcommitment of developed countries to the universality of human rights. Sincethese states dominate international relations, they are the primary judge of their
92 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im
own behavior, as well as that of developing countries. In fact, developed coun-tries have not shown consistent acceptance of the universality of human rights intheir own national policies. This is reflected, for example, in the resistance ofWestern countries to accepting that economic, social, and cultural rights areactually human rights, as proclaimed by the Universal Declaration and numer-ous international treaties (Eide et al., 1994; Steiner and Alston, 1996, p. 256).For instance, Article 25 of the Declaration provides that everyone has a `̀ right toa standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and hisfamily, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary socialservices.'' Thus, these economic and social rights are as much human rights asthe right to life, liberty, and security of person (Article 3), protection againsttorture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 5), andfreedom of opinion and expression (Article 19). No one would suggest thattorture or suppression of freedom of expression be condoned or tolerated any-where in the world today. Yet there is little objection to the denial of food,shelter, and medical care to the majority of human beings around the world,especially those living in developing countries. Western countries also find itdifficult to accept the possibility of protecting any collective or group claim orentitlement as a human right within an existing state, although the first Article ofboth the 1966 Covenants provides for a collective human right to self-determina-tion of `̀ all peoples'' (not nations, countries, or states). Since this Article clearlyenvisages political independence as a means to achieving such objectives aspolitical participation, social development, and economic well-being, denyingany group of people any of the essential elements of this right is a violation of theright itself.
It is true that some economic, social, cultural, and/or collective `̀ interests'' aresubstantially provided for within the national jurisdictions of developed Westerncountries through the normal political and legal processes of each country;sometimes with special constitutional or legal protection against easy violation.But the essence of the human rights paradigm is to ensure that such interests aresafeguarded against the contingencies of national politics and legal processes. Infact, the idea emerged from the experience of Western countries which sought,through constitutional protection, to place certain fundamental civil libertiesbeyond daily politics. That is, recognition of a specific entitlement as a humanright is supposed to enhance the prospects of its practical implementation morethan can be expected from the normal political and legal processes of anycountry. To the extent that they do in fact respect and protect economic, social,and cultural rights, or collective rights, developed countries have nothing to fearfrom accepting those rights as human rights. Conversely, such acceptance isnecessary whenever those rights are not sufficiently respected in the mannerand to the extent required by international human rights standards.
It is true that economic, social, cultural, and collective rights are presentlydifficult to specify and enforce in the same way one can do with civil andpolitical rights. For example, since the right to work cannot practically meanan obligation on the state to actually provide work for every person, the questionis: what should be the content of this right and how can it be implemented?
Human Rights 93
Collective rights raise issues of human agency in determining membership andboundaries of groups, or more generally the dangers of elite appropriation of thecollective voice of groups and communities. However, difficulties are only to beexpected because formal recognition of these rights is much more recent, incomparison to civil and political rights. Moreover, these rights need not neces-sarily fit the model of civil and political rights to qualify as human rights. Theprocesses of concrete definition and implementation of these rights, whichrequire social scientific analysis as suggested here, are not likely to make sig-nificant progress unless they are taken seriously as human rights, rather thansimply objectives of public policy.
The real reason for Western resistance to accepting these rights as humanrights, in my view, is ideological or cultural. Subject to national and regionalvariations, the liberal ideology/culture of these countries tends to hold thateconomic, social, and cultural benefits or services should be provided forthrough the normal political process, instead of being given legal sanction asrights. Because of its emphasis on individual autonomy and privacy, againstother social entitlements as well as the state, the liberal mind finds it difficultto conceive of collective entities or groups as bearers of rights. Liberals may seetheir views as obviously valid to every reasonable person, but that is exactly howideological or cultural conditioning of human behavior works everywhere. Inother words, liberal societies tend to resist accepting economic, social, andcultural rights or collective/group rights as human rights because that is theposition of their own ideology or culture. If ideology or culture can exemptWestern countries from accepting these rights as human rights, non-Westerncountries can claim the same regarding such human rights norms as equalityfor women or protection of freedom of expression.
Moreover, the persistence of some Western governments in asserting chauvi-nistic notions of national sovereignty can fairly be described as relativistic. Forexample, the United States is notorious for seeking to fashion internationalhuman rights treaties to fits its own ideological views and social institutionsduring the drafting process, only to fail to ratify and incorporate those treatiesinto its domestic law for application within the country itself. This is true fromthe 1948 Genocide Convention, which took the United States more than fortyyears to ratify, and only subject to reservations, to the 1989 Convention onthe Rights of the Child, which is now ratified by every country in the worldexcept the United States and Somalia. Since Somalia has had no governmentsince 1992, the United States stands completely alone in refusing to ratify thisConvention. It is difficult to see a significant difference between the position ofthe government of the United States and those of countries like China, Iran, andSaudi Arabia, as all of them are refusing to allow their own domestic practice tobe judged by agreed international standards. Moreover, the position of the USAis especially damaging for the human rights paradigm, not only for its failure tolive up to claims of global leadership in this field, but also because its economicand military power enables it to play a paramount role in shaping internationalrelations, as well as influencing the domestic policies of other countries aroundthe world.
94 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im
Instead of insisting on a sharp dichotomy between universality and relativity,it is better to perceive the issues in terms of a constant mediation between thetwo poles. The realities of enduring cultural diversity around the world, on theone hand, and global multifaceted interaction and interdependence, on the other,challenge both the theoretical validity and practical viability of a framework ofuniversality and relativity as polar extremes. An example of mediation betweenthe excesses of both extremes can be seen in the doctrine of `̀ the margin ofappreciation'' in the European human rights system ± allowing states a degree ofdiscretion in the interpretation and implementation of their human rights obli-gations (Steiner and Alston, 1996, p. 601). But as elaborated elsewhere, it is alsoimportant to strive to achieve wider and more sustainable global overlappingconsensus on human rights norms through internal discourse within differentcultures, and cross-cultural dialogue between them (An-Na`im and Deng, 1990;An-Na`im, 1992).
In conclusion for this section, I would emphasize the need to understand howthe political will to uphold human rights is generated within civil society, or inresponse to its demands. State action is more likely to happen when humanrights are accepted as culturally legitimate than when they are perceived as analien imposition. It is also important to address the economic dimensions of theeffective implementation of human rights, as underlying causes of violations aswell as in the allocation of resources for practical implementation of rights. Evenso-called `̀ negative'' civil and political rights, like freedom of speech or protec-tion against torture, where the state is required to refrain from certain actions,still entail the deployment of material and human resources to implement thenecessary policies. In any case, legal protection has to assume voluntary com-pliance as a general rule because no enforcement regime can cope with massiveand persistent violations. Social scientists can make crucial contributions toaddressing all these and other aspects of the human rights paradigm.
Complementary Legal and Social Science ApproachesComplementary Legal and Social Science Approaches
In view of the complexity of effective response to a wide variety of possiblehuman rights claims in any society today, one should always consider as manyapproaches to the implementation of these rights as possible or advisable in onesetting or another. Many factors affect the implementation of human rights, suchas the level and quality of political commitment to the implementation ofadministrative, educational, and other policies, allocation of economicresources, and civil society activism. These and related factors cannot possiblybe effectively addressed through purely legal approaches, though the latter willremain indispensable. In this final section, I offer an evaluation of legalapproaches, followed by a brief review of how some sociologists haveapproached human rights issues.
The early emphasis on legal approaches to the protection of human rights willprobably continue for the foreseeable future because of the universalization ofEuropean models of the state through colonialism, with its centralized powers
Human Rights 95
over political processes, economic activities, social relations, provision of essen-tial services, and so forth. As those models of the state persisted into thepostcolonial world, thereby entrenching the central role of the state in nationalpolitics and international relations, the human rights paradigm adopted a legalapproach for the protection of human rights. Indeed, the whole human rightssystem has generally emerged from the liberal approach to individual civil rights,as judicially enforceable limitations on the powers of the state in order to protectcertain vital interests of the population. Accordingly, the judicial enforcement ofthese rights as a legal entitlement became the basis for the credibility of admin-istrative, political, educational, and other policies and processes, as the source ofoperational definitions of each human right and as the mechanism for themediation of competing claims of rights. But the limitations of purely legalapproaches to constitutional rights at the national level are even more constrain-ing for the international protection of human rights because, as noted above, thelatter has to overcome domestic resistance without having the power to imposeits will.
Generally speaking, the legal protection of rights assumes the prevalence of acertain conception of the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, and execu-tive compliance with judicial determinations. The legal enforcement of rightsalso requires a certain degree of political stability for the proper development ofan independent and credible judiciary, as well as a legal profession that is willingand able to represent all human rights litigants before the courts. These pre-requisites are frequently lacking, especially when legal protection is mostneeded. For example, the legal systems of most African countries suffer fromserious problems of poor legitimacy and accessibility, as well as lack of humanand material resources (Ake, 1994). The complexity and procedural formality ofpostcolonial legal systems make it difficult for most Africans to have effectiveaccess to legal remedies. Structural and contextual difficulties include prolongedand complex political instability, economic underdevelopment, lack ofindependence and technical resources for the judiciary, and the inadequacy orpoor quality of legal services. Under such conditions, it is not surprising thatpeople will simply abstain from resorting to the courts for the legal enforcementof their rights.
This is not to say, however, that all prerequisites must be present at oncebefore people begin to use the courts to vindicate their human rights. On thecontrary, it seems to me, there is a synergy between the requirements of legalenforcement, on the one hand, and public confidence in the process, on the other.Since people will probably resort to the courts whenever there is the slightestchance of obtaining relief and justice, even a low level of public confidence maycontribute to the development of an independent judiciary, and attract thenecessary legal advice and representation, which may enhance public confidencefurther, and so forth.
But, as already indicated, even the best system for the legal protection ofhuman rights will not be sufficient because the implementation of human rightsrequires different approaches. The mandate of the human rights paradigm ingeneral is to simply provide effective redress, not only legal remedy, for every
96 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im
violation of human dignity and the rights of any person or group. Article 28 ofthe Universal Declaration provides that `̀ everyone is entitled to a social andinternational order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declarationcan be fully realized.'' It is difficult to see how this original broad vision canmaterialize without substantial contributions of sociologists and other socialscientists. The preceding analysis may have already suggested some ways inwhich social science approaches can make such contributions. As a humanrights lawyer, I will now try to envisage how sociologists can improve ourunderstanding of a set of interrelated issues of shared concern, by way ofillustration, without presuming to speculate about specific ways in which theymight do that.
Only a very few North American sociologists, like Rhoda Howard (1995),have consistently and systematically addressed human rights issues in their workin the past (Reynolds, 1998). But stronger interest seems to be emerging morerecently, including efforts to examine the reasons for the earlier lack of soci-ological analysis of these issues in other parts of world as well. For example,Bryan Turner draws attention to the silence in sociology about human rights,and finds it puzzling, given the interest of sociologists in such subjects as socialmovements, social membership, and the general themes of globalization andmobilization (Turner, 1993b, p. 490). A discussion of Turner's outline of a theoryof human rights, and the debate that followed (Waters, 1996b; Turner, 1997), isbeyond the scope of this chapter. The point here is to note the sort of interrelatedthemes Turner is suggesting for analytical connections between sociology andhuman rights issues. For example, recalling that the human rights paradigmseeks to protect rights at the domestic level from an international perspective,without the power to impose its will over national sovereignty, one can appreci-ate the crucial role of social movements for and against this paradigm indifferent societies. However, while sociologists are familiar with the role ofsocial movements in relation to domestic constitutional rights, as noted above,they now need to consider the impact of what is commonly known as `̀ globa-lization'' on the possibilities of international protection of human rights in thedomestic context.
As the means for achieving and safeguarding the interests of their members,social movements have traditionally been engaged in the negotiation of compet-ing claims among themselves, and in relation to the state as a hegemonic politicalinstitution. Some social movements succeed in substantially influencing the state,in pursuit of their own objectives. With the universalization of European modelsof the state through colonialism and its transformation of the postcolonial worldsystem, as noted above, human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs)have become the operational arm of social movements throughout the world, atboth the national and international levels (Steiner and Alston, 1996, p. 456).
Social movements or groups, however, tend to perceive the human rightsparadigm as either supportive of or antagonistic to their values and socialobjectives to varying degrees. All social actors need this paradigm for the`̀ space'' it ensures for them to organize and advocate their view, through free-doms of opinion, expression, and association, as well as the support it might give
Human Rights 97
to their normative claims, such as freedom of religion or the rights of ethnic orcultural groups, and so forth. Yet social actors often try to claim the benefits ofthe human rights paradigm, while rejecting aspects of it that they deem to becontrary to their own values and objectives. This common inconsistency is at theheart of the universality/relativity debate discussed above, in that while all socialactors would welcome the human rights paradigm to the extent that it affirmstheir own values and facilitates their own work, very few are willing to acceptthe totality of this paradigm and its implications, at least regarding matters theydeem to be fundamental to their own position.
In their analysis of these social process at the domestic level, sociologistsshould also consider the international dimensions of the present age of multi-faceted globalization (Woodiwiss, 1996; Axtmann, 1997; Merry, 1997). Thedynamics of social movements and NGO activism are increasingly influenced,if not shaped, by transnational forces and global processes. This is as true for theadvocates of the rights of women and indigenous peoples as it is for thoseconcerned with development and environmental issues. The human rights para-digm is contested by all these and similar social actors at the international as wellas the national level. Indeed, since globalization itself is not a neutral phenom-enon, as it tends to enhance existing power relations, sociologists should seek toapply their conceptual and methodological insights to the working of globalforces and processes at the local and national, as well as the international, levels(Cheah, 1997; Bauman, 1998).
Concluding RemarksConcluding Remarks
By the very nature of its subject matter, and the dynamic processes of thearticulation and implementation of its normative content, the human rightsparadigm offers sociologists and other social scientists a very rich and usefulresearch agenda. As it seeks to negotiate the relationship between the local andthe global, the human rights paradigm can benefit from sociological analysis atboth the national and international levels. Moreover, the human rights paradigmraises questions about the conceptual possibility of the universality and validityof cross-cultural moral judgment. From a sociological perspective, these types ofquestions relate to such issues as the meaning and implications of personhoodand human dignity in interpersonal or communal relations, gender and child±adult relations within the family and wider community, questions of race,ethnicity, and religion within and between communities, the nature and role ofreligion in public life, and the nature of the state and its institutions in relation tosociety at large. Sociological analysis is also necessary for mediating the tensionbetween procedural and substantive aspects of the human rights paradigm; thatis, their role in ensuring `̀ the space'' for struggles for justice, as opposed to beingspecific expressions of substantive justice in individual and communal relations,including questions of affirmative action or positive discrimination.
In conclusion, however, I wish to emphasize that even when judged on its ownterms, the protection of human rights is only part of the answer to the major
98 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im
issues of social justice facing all societies. Other theoretical approaches andpractical strategies for the realization of justice will of course always remainnecessary. Accordingly, the invitation here is for sociologists to contribute to thefurther development and clarification of the human rights paradigm as a majorcomponent of the framework for justice within and between societies through-out the world. As sociological issues become increasingly transnational andglobalized, it is clear that human rights are too important to leave to lawyersand a few political scientists.
Human Rights 99